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Abstract 
Whether perception involves the manipulation of representations is currently heavily debated.           
The Embedded View (EV) advanced by Nico Orlandi seeks a middle passage between             
representationalism and radical enactivism. In this paper I argue for a non-representational            
take on EV. I argue that this is the best way to resolve the objections EV has received from                   
both representationalists and non-representationalists. I analyze this debate, and distinguish          
four sorts of objections: 1) the objection of the wrongfully cut middleman, 2) the argument               
against explanatory exclusionism, 3) the case for scientific benefits of representations, and 4)             
the charge of inconsistent ascription of representational status in EV. I argue that (1) the               
middleman was never cut in EV, and is controversial to boot, (2) ​otherwise equal​,              
non-representational explanations have primacy over representational explanations, due to the          
lack of naturalistic grounds for representations and the unnecessarily ascribed cognitive load            
to the system. Further, I show that (3) puts the cart before the horse, and the arguments on                  
offer are viciously circular. However, the final objection, (4) lays bare a deeper issue for EV.                
At the cost of giving up the middle position, however, the explanatory tools already available               
to EV can be shown to cover the work initially thought to require representation. I conclude                
that EV is best altered to be a non-representational theory of perception. 
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1 Introduction 
Whether perception involves the manipulation of representational content is currently heavily           
debated. A classic Marrian view sees perception as built up step-by-step from a 2D retinal               
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image into the full-blown 3D world we find ourselves in. Each individual step involves a               
separately produced representational image in which the brain detects relevant features to            
produce a more detailed, experientially rich picture (1982). There has been a large variety of               
theories that all regard representational content as central to perception (see Pitt 2017 for an               
overview). Opposed to this, there is a tradition that rejects the idea that representational              1
content plays any role in perception. Typically, non-representational approaches emphasize          
embodiment and environmental interaction, stressing that action and perception are          
intimately connected (Gibson 1979; Varela et al. 1991; Di Paolo et al. 2017; Hutto and Myin                
2017).   2
Recently, many theorists have tried to develop an approach that avoids either of these              
extremes. A popular strand here is prediction error minimization theory, which attempts to             
incorporate the intimate connections between action and perception into a fully           
representational framework (Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2016). The Embedded View (EV) furthers           
this compromissory agenda by steering a middle course in the so-called ‘representation wars’             3
(Orlandi 2014; see also 2012; 2013). Orlandi argues that perceptual processing is            
non-representational, but its perceptual products are representational. Yet EV has seen           
criticism from both sides for its limited use of representations. Where representationalists            
argue EV incorporates too few representations, non-representationalists argue there are too           
many. 
In this paper, I argue that, to respond to the criticism from both representationalists              
and non-representationalists, EV is best off going fully non-representational. I will first set             
the stage by describing EV. Proceeding, I will then analyze the debate to show the perceived                
shortcomings from EV. I distinguish four such objections: 1) the argument that Orlandi             
leaves out the representational middleman; 2) the argument against ​explanatory exclusionism​,           
according to which Orlandi seems to rule out representational readings prematurely; 3) the             
argument for the explanatory benefits of representations, according to which there may be             
benefits to invoking representations that have been overlooked, and 4) an inconsistency            
charge in EV’s ascription of representational status. I argue that the first three objections can               
1 The textbook interpretation of Marr is representational, but it is up for debate whether this is the only                   
interpretation (Orlandi, 2014, note 3). 
2 In both instances there is an incredible variation of theories, and though some certainly find themselves more                  
in one camp than another, a certain degree of fluidity between these camps exists. 
3 I think the name ‘representation wars’ stems from Clark (2015). 
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be deflected, and so pose no threat to EV. Yet the fourth objection, the inconsistency               
argument, is successful and thus problematic for EV. Despite this, I argue that the tools and                
the solution are found in Orlandi’s own work (2014; and 2012 respectively), hence EV can               
easily be amended to incorporate this criticism. Indeed, I will argue that, by taking the               
explanatory tools available to EV more seriously, the range of applicability of EV can be               
shown to cover those aspects of perception that Orlandi thinks require representation. If we              
buy into this solution, EV ceases to be the compromissory view Orlandi (2014) put forward               
and becomes wholly non-representational. In turn, it benefits in having resolved the raised             
objections. 
2 The Embedded View Explained 
In our processing of visual stimuli, we are sensitive to statistical regularities in the world               
(Mole and Zhao 2016, p. 366). This means that certain regularities that we have encountered               
before influence the way we engage with particular stimuli; particular changes in light             
intensity may for example indicate edges. Traditionally, it is thought that the information of              
the statistical regularities needs to be encoded in our brain to explain this sensitivity. For               
example, Marr argues that the brain encodes very specific statistical information regarding            
the occurrences of edges (Marr and Hildreth 1980, p. 202; Marr 1982). More recent proposals               
have reimagined the manner in which this encoding works. Still, the necessity of such              
encoding remains. For example, currently popular prediction error minimization theories          4
state that any statistical regularity we may be sensitive to must be, in some way or some                 
form, encoded in causal-probabilistic models of the world (Gładziejewski 2016; see also            
Hohwy 2013; Clark 2016). 
EV is not at odds with this sensitivity to statistical regularities. However, it challenges              
the encoding requirement. Orlandi argues for EV by way of an inference to the best               
explanation. Here she relies on a widely shared assumption that representations need only be              
invoked “when appeal to environmental and other conditions fails, or is not illuminating”             
(Orlandi, 2014 p. 7, see also Note 15; Pylyshyn 1984, p. 26; Brooks 1991; Burge 2010; Fodor                 
1987; Segal 1989; Van Gelder 1995). The tactic is thus to provide a non-representational              
4 Predictive processing (see Hohwy 2013 and Clark 2016 for some good introductory monographs) is one such                 
theory, in which the rules are thought to be represented in the form of generative models. Some recent takes on                    
the theory however, advocate a non-representational reading (Kirchhoff and Robertson 2018; Bruineberg et al.              
2018; Hutto 2017) 
3 
Accepted manuscript. Post-peer-review. Please do not cite this version. ​Synthese 
alternative to standard representational explanations with at least equal explanatory power.           
With this in place, invoking representations is unnecessary. According to Orlandi, our visual             
system ​relies on the world’s statistical regularities themselves rather than needing to encode             
those regularities internally. “Relying on a fact”, then, “means acting in accordance with a              
fact, and with a corresponding principle, without representing either” (Orlandi 2014, p. 3;             
Orlandi 2012, 2013; see also Ramsey 2007). In which case, perceivers can rely on the facts in                 
the world without having to representing those facts. Orlandi states: 
We can imagine (...) a connectionist network trained to detect something by            
being repeatedly exposed to it. Such training causes the network to display            
characteristic patterns of activation where low-level configurations are        
associated with high-level ones and ​vice versa​. We can then think of a             
high-level state as ‘checking’ the pattern of activation at the lower, sensory            
level where this ultimately just means that the high-level state activates in a             
way that is more or less compatible with the lower-level pattern of activation.             
(Orlandi 2014, p. 88) 
The idea here is that a connectionist network can become sensitive to a particular regularity.               
In more detail, the high-level states of the network become sensitive to the regularities at the                
lower, sensory level. This constitutes a certain bias in the system such that the higher level                
states will track the patterns of activation of lower level states, ‘acting’ in accordance with               
similar patterns, thus tracking, for example, edges. This, it should be noted, is a ‘mere’               
tracking activity, and thus need not be thought of in representational terms. Indeed, there is               
nothing intrinsically representational about the reliable co-activation or covariation of two           
(parts of) systems (Hutto and Myin 2013). Further, Orlandi says: 
The transition between these two tracking states ​is not regulated by an encoded             
assumption​. We can think of it as a mere associative transition. What is             
relevant is that there is a strong connection between states that track            
discontinuities in intensity and states that track edges. (2014 p. 153, emphasis            
added) 
What this means is that the lower level states track the discontinuities in intensity, whereas               
the higher level states activate in accordance with particular patterns of lower level states,              
whilst tracking edges. Crucially, this associative transition does not require any encoding of             
the statistical regularities. “[T]he facts (...) explain why the device does what it does without               
being represented by the device” (Orlandi, 2012 p. 561). In explaining a particular behaviour,              
then, the facts themselves factor into our explanations, not representations of those facts. 
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Thus, we could certainly describe this particular network as ​representing ​the           
statistical regularities that it is sensitive to. ​Prima facie​, at least, it is not conceptually               
incoherent. Adding this representational gloss, however, confers no explanatory advantage.          
Moreover, it comes at some cost. For it would ascribe more labor to our cognitive               
architecture than necessary. And it would lose some of the original ontological parsimony             
(Orlandi 2013, p. 739). Recall that, as we saw above, “representational notions are only              
needed when organic, functional, and environmental conditions are insufficient” (Orlandi          
2014, p. 54). Here however, they suffice just fine. 
One of the key issues with representational content is its origin (Hutto and Myin              
2013; 2017). Broadly, the issue is as follows. Though representations have been defined in a               
multitude of ways, a core feature that distinguishes a representational relation from a merely              
covariational relation, is that they have content: they describe their target in a way that it may                 
not be so (Travis 2004). The hard problem of content lies in finding a naturalistic origin for                 56
content: a task that is, as of yet, unfulfilled (Hutto and Myin 2013, 2017). 
Ideally, an alternative proposal, like EV, should avoid the problems it is supposed to              
resolve. If so, we can ask: what is the origin of the reliance relation? Orlandi speaks of the                  
visual system as being ​wired​, having features that “developed, and continue to develop under              
evolutionary and environmental pressure” (2014 p. 3). She argues that it would be perhaps              
more surprising if evolution had ​not wired us to be sensitive to, say, the particular changes in                 
light intensity corresponding to edges (Orlandi 2014, p. 154). However, while it is likely that               7
the wiring of our visual system is a consequence of evolutionary pressures, it seems more is                
needed if we are to account for the full range of statistical regularities we can become                
sensitive to. For example, a lot of these sensitivities emerge only later in life, and some at                 
timescales that evolutionary adaptation could only dream of! How then does EV account for              
this malleability of the sensitivities of the visual system? Or in other words: how do we                
account for the features that develop not only under evolutionary, but also under             
environmental pressures? 
5 This is not to say that content is all it takes for a relation to be representational, only that it is minimally                       
necessary. 
6 This excludes deflationary notions of representation. In this paper, representations are minimally required to               
have content, as to not over-generate representations or ascribe them too liberally (see also Ramsey, 2007). 
7 Similar arguments can be found in the work of Järvilehto (1998) and Warren (2005). 
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Typically a wired system is conceived of as ​hardwired and incapable of adapting to              
the environment (Orlandi 2014, p. 146; see for example Rock 1983, p. 277). This need not be                 
the case, however. Remember that a connectionist network is wired in the sense EV deems               
the visual processing system to be. Orlandi states: 
Networks are wired systems capable of adjusting to context. In the learning            
period, they come to process information in a new way without having any             
localizable structures that encode instructions. They come to be sensitive to the            
presence of mine echoes by simply adjusting their connections. Similarly,          
pigeons may stop pecking on a key as a result of extinction or             
counterconditioning without following any rules. (Orlandi 2014, p. 147) 
She continues: 
The fact that they are adaptable in this way does not mean that they are               
rule-following. Rewiring due to inverting lenses, or to reinforcement and          
reward, amounts to changing the way a certain function is performed through a             
physical intervention. It constitutes an instance of malleability without being an           
instance of following (new) principles. (Orlandi 2014, p. 147) 
This means that adapting a function to better fit the current environment does not entail an                
exchange of less fit rules for more adaptive rules. It does not entail any form of                
rule-following whatsoever. A functional change can do the trick of malleability just as well. 
Above I have given a brief overview of how Orlandi envisions visual processing to be               
possible non-representationally, whilst also retaining sensitivity to statistical regularities.         
Orlandi also covers typical issues for non-representational accounts of perception, such as            
misperception, illusions, stability and constancy (Orlandi 2014, ch. 4) and multi-stability           
(Orlandi 2012). However, although Orlandi argues strongly for non-representational visual          
processing, she does think of the visual product as being representational. It is this concession               
to representationalism that puts her in the crossfire of the ‘representation wars’.  
Yet, one would think that if representations are not needed to account for the wide               
range of cases covered above, then what still remains unexplained? I will answer this              
question by identifying what Orlandi deems necessary for something to count as a             
representation. She discerns three distinct features of a representation: 1) standing in, 2),             
informing, and 3) guiding performance (Orlandi 2014, p. 9). Thus, representations need to             
“​stand in for something other than themselves and in so doing they act as ​mediators within a                 
system or a process” (p. 9). Representations also need to inform and although she concedes               
that the term ‘information’ is heavily disputed in representation contexts, Orlandi thinks that             
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representations inform, say or ‘mean’ something about the target (p. 9). Finally,            
representations need to be “causally active”, “guiding the behavior of a system or organism,              
described in certain general terms, by standing in and informing” (p. 10). 
My focus here will be on the first feature: standing in. For us to legitimately describe                
a system as containing representations that ​stand in for something, these representations need             
to be ​decouplable from what initially caused the representation. This means that the state              
should stand for its representational target (that which it represents) even in the ​absence of               
that target. If we take a portrait picture to be a representation, for example, the picture stands                 
for the portrayed person even in the absence of the person. Of particular interest here is the                 
term absence. For Orlandi, anything that does not directly impinge on our senses, should be               
deemed absent. 
She uses two cases to exemplify this. First, when a rabbit is looking at a coyote, one                 
may think that the coyote‘s reflected light is currently directly impinging on one’s senses.              
Orlandi concedes that the ​front of the coyote is, but not a full coyote. For example, the coyote                  
may even be partially occluded by a rock it is standing behind. Regardless, the rabbit reacts to                 
the presence of a full coyote (Orlandi 2014, p. 127). Second, Orlandi claims that the same                
phenomenon occurs whenever we see, say, a cow. For although only the image of the               
frontside of a cow impinges on our senses, we still react to it, judge it and take it to be a                     
full-blown cow. She argues that “this ​taking constitutes an early representational capacity. It             
is a capacity that involves an abstraction” (Orlandi 2014, p. 150). Representational capacities             
are thus twofold. The perspectivally invisible (and thus absent) backsides of the objects we              
encounter require representation, since these aspects are abstracted from the direct stimuli.            
Further, to ​take the light reflected off a cow ​as ​a full-blown 3D cow also requires                
representation. The representation meets all three conditions: it ​stands in for the currently             
invisible backside, it ​informs about the cow, and it ​guides our actions in the sense that we                 
judge it to be a full-blown cow (and, under this construction, this judgment guides us so that                 
we may approach it to pet it etc.).  
In sum, EV pulls visual processing apart from the visual percepts it produces. If EV is                
right, rather than needing to encode particular rules, we instead rely on the facts in the world.                 
There is thus no need for the visual system to represent the statistical regularities it relies on.                 
However, in the visual product there is the need to invoke representations. For despite being               
only exposed to a single side of an object at a time, we nonetheless take the stimulus to come                   
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from a full-blown object. Further, we take the light reflected off of particular objects to be                
caused by objects of particular types. If so, then the visual product does require              
representational capacities. 
3 The Embedded View Under Fire 
Not loyal to either the representational or non-representational sides, EV has attracted            
criticism from both camps, creating an interesting bipartisan agreement that halfway is no             
way at all. The agreement extends beyond this point however. I distinguish four distinct              
objections put forward by opponents of EV, the first three explicitly in favour of a more                
thoroughly representationalist approach, the final amenable to theorists across the          
representational-non-representational divide. The first objection is that of the relevant          
middleman, and is specific to Bayesian brain theories. In Bayesian brain theories, priors are              
often identified with representations (Hohwy, 2013). The argument is that priors requiring            
further explanation does not mean they do not have any explanatory power so that they need                
to be excluded ​tout court ​. The second objection is against explanatory exclusionism: this             
argues against the notion that, if there are non-representationalist explanations, then their            
representationalist counterparts become obsolete. The third objection states that         
representations hold explanatory benefits for our scientific endeavours, and thus need to be             
included. The final, unifying objection is that Orlandi’s application of representations is            
inconsistent. Below I will discuss these objections in more detail. 
3.1 The relevant middleman 
Rescorla argues that Orlandi ignores the middleman. He says: “[i]f we explain X by citing Y                
and then explain Y by citing Z, it hardly follows that Y is explanatorily irrelevant”. He                
explains this with an example: “a physicist can at least partially explain the acceleration of               
some planet by citing the planet's mass and the net force acting on the planet, even if she does                   
not explain why that net force arises” (Rescorla 2015). Put differently, even if Y requires               
further explanation, it may still serve in explaining X. Y’s requiring further explanation does              
not diminish its explanatory power.  
To be precise, Rescorla’s point concerns Bayesian modeling theories of perception           
and cognition. An issue Orlandi brings up is that it is unclear where the priors, that is, the                  
brain’s anticipation of what it is about to encounter, come from (Orlandi 2014, p. 91-93). An                
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elaborate discussion of the issue of the origin of priors in Bayesian theories of perception is                
outside of the scope of this paper, but it is roughly as follows. According to Bayesian theories                 
of perception, the brain attempts to reduce the uncertainty concerning the stimuli entering the              
system (X in Rescorla’s example). An issue here is that, for any one stimulus, there is                
conceptually an infinite amount of possible causes (the underdetermination problem). To           
limit the hypothesis space, then, priors are introduced. These are (basic) assumptions about             
the way the world works that restrict the variety of possible causes of the stimuli (Y in                 
Rescorla’s example). Standardly, Bayesian brain theories are considered representational.         
The representations are thought to be instantiated in the form of priors (Hohwy 2013;              
Gładziejewski 2016).   8
In this sense, the question about the origin of priors in Bayesian brain theories, though               
technically separate from, can be cast as a particular instantiation of the question about the               
origin of representations, specifically in the context of Bayesian brain theories. Indeed, if             
priors are thought to be representational in Bayesian brain theories, then, in that context, a               
discussion of the origin of priors in Bayesian brain theories is also a discussion of the origin                 
of representations in Bayesian brain theories. Rescorla thinks that, due to this controversy,             
Orlandi excludes the priors (Y) because her environmental account (Z) would be needed to              
explain our visual system (X) anyway. Rescorla treats it as a form of cutting out the                
middleman. Instead, he argues that the explanatory value of Y is not impacted by it requiring                9
further explanation. Even more, he argues that “one can explain X by citing Y, without in                
turn explaining Y” (Rescorla, 2015). Representations thus need not be explained for them to              
be explanatorily useful, according to Rescorla. Put differently, even if the priors (and thus the               
representations) are to be explained further with Orlandi’s embedded explanation, the priors            
themselves still have explanatory value.  
3.2 Against explanatory exclusionism 
EV is also accused of committing a form of ​explanatory exclusionism (Polger 2015, p. 345).               
Polger considers Orlandi to be choosing between competing explanations. He wonders:           
“[w]hy should we embrace an explanatory exclusion principle to the effect that the             
availability of functional or mechanistic explanations rules out the legitimacy of           
8 Discussion of Bayesian brain theories is outside the scope of this paper. Hohwy (2013) and Clark (2016) are                   
two excellent monographs for an introduction into the most popular form of Bayesian brain theories. 
9 As we shall see below, I think this portrayal of Orlandi’s position is incorrect. 
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representational explanations"? (Polger 2015, p. 345). Polger ponders rhetorically why          
representational explanations should be less preferable to functional or mechanistic          
explanations. Non-representational explanations are not, Polger thinks, by default preferable          
to representational explanations. The idea is that Orlandi would have to do more to show that                
her non-representational explanation is preferable to competing representational explanations.         
Indeed, there is no good reason to throw representational explanations out simply because             
there are non-representational accounts. 
3.3 Representations with benefits 
Another objection against EV is that invoking representations in our explanations of            
perceptual phenomena offers explanatory benefits. Leaving our explanation to merely          
“organic, functional, and environmental” conditions, so it is claimed, is insufficient. The            
addition of representations is supposed to make up for the difference. Rescorla argues that              
“Orlandi’s analysis entrains a significant loss in explanatory power. If we adopt a realist              
perspective on priors”, he thinks, “we can explain why various changes in environmental             
conditions yield various changes in the mapping from sensory stimulations to percepts:            
namely, because the priors change a certain way” (Rescorla 2015). 
This again concerns Bayesian modeling theories of perception and cognition, where           
the priors refer to the brain’s anticipation of what it is about to encounter. Orlandi               
de-representationalized this notion, thinking of such anticipation in functional terms, the           
training of a neural network. Rescorla then argues that priors add explanatory utility by              
exchanging a step in Orlandi’s story. Rather than the environment influencing the neural             
network’s training, it influences the priors. Both of these are thought to be the explanation for                
the change in our percepts in their respective theories. Rescorla thinks that this exchange, the               
realist position on the priors, adds explanatory value. 
Polger (2015) puts forward a similar point. He thinks that “[r]epresentationalist           
explanations might be justified by their utility for explaining how those mechanisms of biases              
and constraints came to be, or what those systems have in common with other human               
perceptual systems and with physiologically distinctive visual systems in other creatures”           
(Polger 2015, p. 345). The addition of representations is thought to help both evolutionary              
and environmental explanations of the functional features described by Orlandi. The idea            
seems to be that, if we posit representational contents as that which is present in all our                 
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perceptual channels (both our vision and hearing can be imagined as being representational)             
and also for such perceptual channels in non-human creatures, the shared representational            
contents can serve as a starting point for explaining what we have in common. 
3.4 Inconsistency 
The third and final objection has managed to unify both representationalists and            
non-representationalists alike. It is an inconsistency objection concerning Orlandi’s         
ascriptions of representations in EV. As we have seen in Section 2, Orlandi understands              
visual processing as non-representational, but the perceptual product does require          
representations. However, if we were to consistently apply Orlandi’s conditions for what            
counts as a representation, so it is objected, then a lot more features she has termed                
non-representational, would in fact count as representations. She thus applies her own            
conditions inconsistently. Put differently, her conditions for representational content actually          
lead to a proliferation of such representations. 
Recall that Orlandi argues that representations are used in abstracting the image of a              
cow from mere electromagnetic radiation that impinges on our senses. Polger argues that  
“if this basic sort of abstraction is all that is required to count as a               
representation, then contrary to Orlandi, representation occurs at the earliest          
stages of visual processing … It seems to me that Orlandi has made it too easy                
for early visual states to count as representations.” (Polger 2015, p. 344) 
Despite Orlandi’s care in the ascription of representations in visual processing, Polger argues             
that this frugality is not mirrored in explaining the visual product. Mole and Zhao (2016)               
argue along the same lines. In particular, they discuss one experiment that displays features of               
our visual system that, if we are to follow Orlandi’s conditions, would be representational.              
Yet, when analyzed, all of the examples they offer are exactly of the sort that EV is supposed                  
to de-representationalize, that is, they are examples in which the subject becomes sensitive to              
a newfound statistical regularity. Mole and Zhao portray these as counterexamples she may             
not have been aware of. However, I claim these examples may be better understood as               10
10 Mole and Zhao (2016) argue roughly that the subjects in the experiments have become sensitive to newfound                  
statistical regularities in the environment, so that they could not have been hardwired. With a hidden assumption                 
that systems can only become sensitive to new statistical regularities with representations, they conclude that               
representations thus ​must in some cases be used in visual processing. This bypasses Orlandi’s explanation of                
malleability. 
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demonstrating the shortcomings in Orlandi’s application of the stated conditions for           
representational content.  
Hutto and Myin raise a similar point. They state: 
Consider that Orlandi argues, as does REC , that positing sensitivities to           11
statistical patterns of variation is all that is needed in order to explain             
perceptual processing and that there is no need or advantage in positing            
contentful representations in such explanations. Yet such statistical patterns are          
just as unavailable to directly inform perceptual processing as are the backsides            
of objects are to inform the final products of visual experiences. (Hutto and             
Myin 2017, p. 162) 
Absence, or unavailability, is a central term in Orlandi’s usage of representations. This is              
intended to cover the ​decouplability requirement as well as the ​standing in requirement for              
representational content. What is present and currently available in the environment, need not             
be represented internally. The ‘original’ may be used without making a ‘copy’. Yet if this is                
all that it takes, Hutto and Myin argue, then what are we to make of the statistical regularities                  
themselves? Surely, if the image of a cow requires representational abstraction from            
electromagnetic radiation, then how do the statistical regularities present themselves directly?           
Statistical regularities, of course, are never witnessed directly. Hutto and Myin thus argue that              
the representational content of statistical regularities stands or falls together with that of the              
backsides of objects. This too points out Orlandi’s inconsistency in the ascription of             
representations. In sum, Orlandi’s inconsistency in the ascription of representational content           
is consistently picked out by people from a wide variety of theoretical colors. As we will see                 
below, it also is the most pertinent issue for EV. 
4 The Embedded Fire Extinguisher and the Ember 
In this section I will give a response to the above objections from the standpoint of EV. In the                   
cases of answering the objections mentioned in Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, I will attempt to                
offer a rebuttal. I argue that the inconsistency issue of Section 3.4 proves to be trickier,                
although the explanatory tools available to EV provide the solution. 
11 REC stands for Radically Enactive Cognition, and is a non-representational approach to cognition proposed               
by Hutto and Myin (2017; see also 2013). 
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4.1 The controversial middleman 
Rescorla objects that Orlandi cuts out a relevant explanatory mediator. Specifically, he argues             
we can explain X by citing Y, which in turn can be explained by citing Z. The appearance                  
and necessity of Z, he argues, need not impair the explanatory utility of Y. He makes an                 
analogy with a physicist, who explains the movement of celestial bodies (X) with net force               
(Y). Net force itself requires further explanation, perhaps by citing the mass of all physical               
bodies in the system (in the form of Z). Nonetheless, it can be used to explain X. Though I                   
think the example is solid, it need not generalize to other cases. In particular, it need not                 
apply to the use of representations to explain perceptual phenomena. 
There are two relevant differences here. 1) Orlandi could be understood as cutting out              
Rescorla’s imagined middleman, that is, if we can explain X by citing Z directly, then we do                 
not need to first explain X by citing Y before finally turning to Z. For example, if we can                   
explain perception by citing functional, organic mechanisms, then we need not explain            
perception by first citing priors, which can then be explained by citing functional             
mechanisms. If this is correct, then contrary to Rescorla, it is not the case that Y becomes                 
explanatorily irrelevant because it is explained by Z. For the functional mechanisms do not              
explain the priors, but rather the phenomena themselves. In which case, Y and Z are thus                
competing ​explanations both intended to explain X. Y’s representational explanation has thus            
never started her job as a middleman in EV; she thus could not have been fired as Rescorla                  
seems to argue. 
2) Recall the widely shared assumption that representational explanations are only           
necessary if we lack simpler, ontologically and computationally more parsimonious,          
explanations that we have seen in Section 2 (Orlandi 2013, 2014; Pylyshyn 1984, p. 26;               
Brooks 1991; Burge 2010; Fodor 1987; Segal 1989; Van Gelder 1995). It is thus not thought                
to be conceptually incoherent, or otherwise impossible for there to be a representational             
explanation in tandem with a functional, organic or environmental explanation. Instead, it is             
thought to be ​unnecessary for us to appeal to a term as ontologically and cognitively heavy as                 
representations if we can show simpler explanations are sufficient. These considerations           
follow from Orlandi’s inference to the best explanation strategy. She does not aim to show               
that representational explanations are incoherent or incompetent. Instead, she offers a better            
explanation, which at least in part relies on being a simpler explanation. 
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Further, at least to my knowledge, net force is an uncontroversial term in physics.              
This status allows it to be useful in explaining celestial movements. However, if net force               
were to turn out to be a fundamentally questionable concept, that is, one for which there is no                  
naturalistic foundation (as of yet), then using it to explain celestial movement would not be               
warranted. Consider using the touch of Zeus to explain celestial movement. At least one of               
the reasons this explanation is not accepted is because the touch of Zeus has no naturalistic                
foundation. I propose that the same goes for representational contents. Consider that the             
project to naturalize content has so far proved unsuccessful, and increasingly more people are              
becoming pessimistic towards a resolution (Rosenberg 2015 and Hutto and Myin 2013; 2017             
among others). Rescorla acknowledges this difficulty (2015), but fails to see why the lack of               
even a prospect of a naturalistic explanation makes the use of representational explanations             
inherently unappealing. 
Note, however, that Rescorla’s point only indirectly concerns representations. This is           
because the priors he discusses are typically conceptualized as representations in Bayesian            
brain theories (Hohwy 2013; Gładziejewski 2016). To recapitulate, to limit the hypothesis            
space for the brain’s estimate of what stimuli it is about to encounter, priors are introduced.                
Here priors are continuously updated assumptions about the structure of the world. It is still               
unclear however, where priors originate from. Nonetheless, he argues, priors need not be             
explained in order to have explanatory force. Yet this seems highly problematic. We explain              
how the brain reduces uncertainty by reference to priors, of which the origins are unknown. It                
seems like we explain a mystery by a further mystery, merely moving the goalpost without               
actually cashing out an explanation. Indeed, it echoes the problem of invoking representations             
without explaining them. In both cases we attempt to use unexplained, quite possibly             
unexplainable concepts to explain the phenomena.  12
4.2 Explanatory frugality 
Polger (2015) wonders why we should exclude representational explanations merely due to            
the availability of functional or mechanistic alternatives. On the surface, this exclusion seems             
to presuppose the superiority of non-representational contenders from the offset. But           
remember that, as of yet, the naturalization of representational contents remains unsettled.            
12 See Clark (2016) for a proposed solution to the origin of priors, and see Hutto (2017) and Hutto and Myin                     
(2017) for an objection to this. 
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Further, even among those that use representational explanations it is commonly thought that             
the ascription of representations is only necessary in the absence of simpler alternatives             
(Orlandi 2013, 2014; Pylyshyn 1984, p. 26; Burge 2010; Fodor 1987; Segal 1989). The only               
way out, some think, is to simply accept content as a basic metaphysical particle of existence                
(Shapiro 2014 p. 218). If non-representational explanations are explanatorily equal to           
representational explanations, then we should prefer the metaphysically lighter option (using           
Occam’s time-tested razor), much like we do when rejecting the touch of Zeus as an               
explanation. Until the naturalization of content becomes a more promising area of research,             
equally or more powerful non-representational explanations should be preferred over          
representational ones. In this particular sense, non-representational explanations, otherwise         
equal, are superior to representational explanations. This, again, does not mean it is             
incoherent to add representations to a non-representational explanation. It is simply that            
doing so does not add explanatory value (as the non-representational explanation is at least              
equal in explanatory power to the representational explanation). Moreover, it unnecessarily           
adds a metaphysically unclear and cognitively heavy component to an otherwise simpler            
explanation. In short, it is not incoherent. But, it is not wise either. 
4.3 Begging questions on explanatory benefits 
Rescorla argued that we could gain explanatory benefits by adopting a realist stance on              
priors. This would allow us to explain ​why our percepts have changed. A realist’s priors are,                
in a sense, quantifications of the neural network-like activity described by Orlandi (2014).             
Not only does the neural network change its wirings, but these wirings represent numerical              
statistical values distributed over a variety of possible outcomes. But does this offer more of               
an explanation than the functional approach? It is easy to see that EV’s wiring explanation               
does the same work, by adapting Rescorla’s sentence: “we can explain why various changes              
in environmental conditions yield various changes in the mapping from sensory stimulations            
to percepts: namely, because the [wirings] change a certain way” (2015, edited by the author).              
 13
13 This is not to discredit the empirical research programme of Bayesian brain theories of perception and                 
cognition, which seems promising (see Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2016). This is a point about how to interpret the                  
priors used in this research. There is a difference between using Bayesian models as scientists to model and                  
predict behaviour of animals, and a realist position concerning the models used as existing in the animal’s head                  
(or body). Rescorla (2015) favors an interpretation of the scientific literature that involves a realist position of                 
these priors. Here I argue that doing so does not add any explanatory value. 
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There are two reasons why, in itself, a realist position on priors does not add any                
explanatory benefit. First, it is unclear what quantification of a biological process adds             
beyond numbers. These numbers may feature well in models of biofunctional mechanisms.            
But there is an important difference between using these numbers and models to describe or               
predict animal behavior and actually ​ascribing these numbers and models to the animal itself.              
Doing the latter prompts the question of how these models are instantiated in the brain, in                
what way the numerical probabilistic values are ‘real’, and even whether this requires a realist               
position about, say, abstract objects (and the problems that ensue). None of these questions              
are easily answered.  
Second, even if we were to allow that there is an explanatory benefit, it is unclear how                 
introducing a feature that is in itself fundamentally contested would help our explanatory             
efforts. This draws back on our earlier ‘touch of Zeus’-style explanations. Until we have, at               
the very least, a promise of how the ‘touch of Zeus’ can be naturalized, naturalistic but                
otherwise equal explanations should take precedence. The same should go for           
representational contents.  
Polger argues that representations can explain how our functional mechanisms came           
to be, and expose the similarities between similar systems within human organisms (think of              
different perceptual channels), but also similar perceptual channels of different organisms           
(such as a dog’s vision). Yet it is unclear why representational explanations would do a better                
job at explaining how particular functions came to be than organic and functional             
explanations: the type more typically used in evolution-theoretic explanations. More          
importantly however, it seems circular. We first posit that our and non-humans’ sensory             
channels share the use of representations, before using this posit to explain those similarities.              
Finally, we claim this supports a realist position of our earlier theoretical posits. With this we                
have come full circle, and viciously so.  
4.4 The inconsistency and the non-representational solution 
Polger (2015), Mole and Zhao (2016), Myin (2016) and Hutto and Myin (2017) have all               
argued that Orlandi’s ascription of representations is inconsistent. Each of them has argued             
that at least one other feature of the visual processing system fulfills EV’s conditions. In this                
section, I will focus in particular on Hutto and Myin’s (2017) suggestion that the backsides of                
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objects and the perception of abstract properties such as COWness warrant the same             
representational status as the statistical regularities, but the solution extends to other cases.  
Recall that Orlandi identifies three conditions for anything to be a representation: 1)             
standing in, 2), informing, and 3) guiding performance (Orlandi 2014, p. 9). A possible              
objection to Hutto and Myin’s suggestion is then that our ‘perception’ of backsides of objects               
legitimately covers condition (1), whereas getting attuned to statistical regularities does not.            
The backsides are (to some extent) present in our visual percept (Orlandi 2014, p. 125). This                
requires, according to Orlandi, a representation to stand in for a backside that is not               
technically present, but does appear in our percept. The statistical regularities however, do             
not appear in the same way. There is only the brain’s interactional attunement to regularities               
encountered in the world. There is thus nothing internally that ‘stands in’ for them. This               
would cause the statistical regularities to not meet condition (1). The backsides of objects do               
meet that condition. 
The issue is whether this distinction between statistical regularities and the backsides            
of objects as being non-representational and representational respectively is justified. Both           
the statistical regularities and the backsides of objects are stimulus-free; they are absent in the               
sense discussed in Section 2. At this point, the ascription of representational status seems              
stipulative. Orlandi concedes that representational explanations for sensitivity to statistical          
regularities are possible. The reason why this feature of visual processing is            
de-representationalized, is because she provides a functional explanation that does not require            
representations. This is a metaphysically and cognitively less taxing way to explain the same              
phenomena, and should thus be preferred, given all that has been said above. Statistical              
regularities then do not have a stand-in, thus do not meet condition (1), and so are                
non-representational. 
Orlandi (2014) does not discuss non-representational options for ‘seeing the          
backsides’, and thus makes it seem like the representational interpretation is the only route              
(perhaps much like how the sensitivity to statistical regularities may have seemed before her              
account). This, in the context of Orlandi (2014), makes it appear that she consistently applied               
her own conditions of favouring non-representational explanations when present.         
Interestingly, Orlandi (2012) has previously offered a non-representational solution to this           
issue. Here, our interaction with the rigidity of objects (and those objects thus having              
backsides) is explained through the same mechanism as other statistical regularities in the             
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world, like the co-occurrence of changes in light intensity and edges. After all, there is a                
robust statistical regularity so that the patterns of light pertaining to objects co-occur with              
these objects’ rigidity. Indeed, it is a regular occurrence that the objects we encounter are 3D                
objects with front- and backsides. She says:  
“Objects in the world are typically rigid and the visual system can rely on this               
fact to produce a representation of objects directly from the retinal stimulation.            
Because the causes of retinal stimuli are typically rigid, we end up seeing the              
world that way” (Orlandi 2012, p. 560) 
The rigidity of objects is thus explained by way of the exact same non-representational              
process as, for example, edges are. We do not have to invoke internal representations of the                
backsides of objects to explain our perception of rigid objects. Instead, we can rely on the                
robust statistical regularity that the objects we encounter are typically rigid. Any object that is               
rigid has a backside (even if they are not always the backsides that we have become attuned                 
to, like a realistic cardboard cutout of a cow) , so if we see rigid objects, we ‘see’ the                  14
backsides to the extent necessary. Positing that we need representational content for the             
backsides of objects is superfluous.  15
The further representational capacity concerns the abstraction involved in ​taking a           
particular pattern of electromagnetic radiation impinging on our senses as an image of a cow.               
It is now not difficult to see how her own proposed mechanism can be employed to explain                 
this capacity to some extent. There is an important distinction that needs to be explicated               
here. I suggest that what is captured in the ​taking capacity by Orlandi is two distinct                
capacities. In saying that we ​take a particular pattern to be a cow, 1) there is a judgment that                   
goes beyond perception in itself in which we ​judge the pattern to be a cow, and 2) there is the                    
capacity to, by being exposed to that particular pattern, interact with the cow in the world we                 
encounter it. (1), the judgment, is to be read in the same way we ​take ​a sarcastic comment to                   
mean the opposite of what it explicitly says. This ​taking capacity is a lingual, socioculturally               
developed capacity that goes beyond the actual hearing of the comment itself. As such, this               
14 The possibility to make mistakes is not reason to doubt this explanation. Instead, it speaks in its favor. After                    
all, it is because we are wired to see rigid objects when encountering particular patterns of stimulation, that the                   
system sometimes fails and we become susceptible to illusions. Complete exposition of this is outside the scope                 
of this paper, but see Orlandi (2014, ch. 4) for a more elaborate explanation, as well as similar                  
non-representational, embedded explanations of misperception in general and multi-stability.  
15 See also Di Paolo et al. (2017) that explain the ‘seeing of backsides’ in terms of interactional relevance. We                    
approach a particular object as having a backside when the backside is relevant to our current activity. A                  
keyboard is not interacted with as having a backside currently not visible to the eye, unless we, say, pick it up. A                      
teacup on the other hand, typically affords picking up and its backside will thus be ‘seen’ more regularly. 
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aspect of the ​taking ​capacity is not an explanandum in the category of perception, and with                
that it is outside the scope of EV, and this paper. Roughly, the idea is that language, or                  
content-involving practice, is an extension of action in a sociocultural environment (further            
exposure of this idea is outside the scope of this paper, but see Moyal-Sharrock 2019; Hutto                
and Satne 2015; Hutto and Myin 2017 for positions along these lines).  
Part (2) of the ​taking capacity, the capacity to interact with a cow in the world, by                 
being exposed to a particular pattern of stimulation ​is part of the explanandum of EV, and can                 
also be explained. The perception of a cow relies on the statistical regularities involved with               
the particular patterns of stimulation caused by cows, and the presence of cows. The              
perceptual system can become sensitive to these statistical regularities, and may rely on them              
in our perception of cows. These sensitivities go on to influence our interactional behaviour              
and perception much in the same way our sensitivity to edges does. Indeed, this explains our                
perception of cows in the same way the statistical regularities and interactional history             
explain edge detection or our perception of rigid objects. A primary difference is that a               
sensitivity to edges can plausibly be thought of as having developed by evolutionary             
pressures, whereas a sensitivity to cows is more likely to have developed ontogenetically due              
to environmental pressures. This allows EV to circumvent the inconsistency objection raised            
in Section 3.3. Given Orlandi’s idea that representational explanations should only be            
instantiated if functional, organic or environmental explanations are insufficient, EV should           
thus adopt this non-representational approach.  
What, then, is left of the compromissory position EV intended to take in the              
representation wars as put forward in Orlandi (2014)? EV started out as a view that held onto                 
non-representationalism for visual processing, but argued for a representational view of the            
visual product. The solution for the inconsistency problem offered above          
de-representationalizes the two central features of vision that Orlandi thought required the            
ascription of representational capacities to be explained. As a consequence, EV has now gone              
fully non-representational and loses its status of a representationally compromissory view.           
Indeed, the view is now much closer to a fully non-representational view as defended by the                
likes of Hutto and Myin (2017).  
Buying into this solution comes with a few further advantages. EV in its original form               
would still have to answer to the hard problem of content for visual products, that is, the                 
problem of finding a naturalistic grounding for representational content, commonly agreed to            
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be minimally necessary for representation (Hutto and Myin 2013). Non-representational EV           
circumvents this hard problem of content by not positing representations in either perceptual             
processing nor perceptual products. This further increases the ascribed frugality of the brain’s             
role as it need not trade in cognitively heavy representations. It also has ontological frugality.               
After all, the non-naturalistic status of representational contents is unlikely to change anytime             
soon (Rosenberg 2015; Shapiro 2014, p. 218; Hutto and Myin 2013, 2017). Further, not              
trading anymore in such unexplained posits allows this to remain metaphysically           
parsimonious.  
Finally, it is worth noting that no new additions or similar ​ad hoc reasonings are               
added. Orlandi’s body of work on EV already held the tools needed to fix the issue of                 
inconsistency, while also broadening the explanatory range of its primary feature, namely, the             
outsourcing of cognitive tasks onto the environment.  
5 Conclusion 
In this paper I have assessed the debate around Orlandi’s proposed Embedded View of              
vision. This view steers a middle course between representationalist and          
non-representationalist views by arguing that visual processing is non-representational,         
whereas its products are representational. Both representationalists and        
non-representationalists alike have challenged this view. I described four such challenges. I            
then offered rebuttals of three of those challenges, while also acknowledging that the fourth              
raises a significant problem. This problem concerned the inconsistency in Orlandi’s           
ascription of representational contents. However, I showed that Orlandi has the tools            
necessary to fix this problem (and perhaps even part of the solution (see Orlandi 2012)). I                
conclude then that EV is best interpreted non-representational all the way down. As such, EV               
becomes a metaphysically and cognitively more frugal view, which, when placed within the             
context of the representation wars, is to its advantage. 
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